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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COU TY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
GLEN W. ROLLINS, RUTH ELLEN 
ROLLINS, NANCY LOmSE ROLLINS, 
and O. WAYNE ROLLINS 
II, as trustees of The 1993 Gary W. Rollins 
Marital Trust, 
Plaintiffs. 
v. 
LOR, INC., GARY W. ROLLINS and 
R. RANDALL ROLLINS, 
Defendants. 
--------------------~ F~LED IN OFFICE 
FEB 04 2015 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil Action No.: 2014CV249480 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Related Cases: 2010CV190046 
2011CV203082 
COpy 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
On January 14,2015, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
For Judgment on the Pleadings. Upon consideration of the briefs and arguments of counsel, the 
Court finds as follows: 
Plaintiffs (the "Trustees") are the trustees of The 1993 Gary W. Rollins Marital Trust (the 
"Marital Trust"). The sole asset of the Marital Trust is 56,507 non-voting shares of LOR, Inc. 
("LOR"). LOR is a Rollins family closely held corporation. Defendants Gary and Randall 
Rollins, individually, own both voting and non-voting shares, and the other shares of LOR are 
held directly by, or are held in trusts for the benefit of, family members. The Marital Trust's 
56,507 non-voting shares represent approximately 18% of LOR's shares. 
Ruth Rollins is the ex-wife of Gary, the mother of the Trustees, and the sole lifetime 
beneficiary of the interest income of the Marital Trust. As a part of the divorce settlement, Gary 
offered to buy Ruth's lifetime income interest in the Marital Trust for $5 million and Ruth agreed 
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to seek the approval of the Trustees for this transaction. The Trustees determined that the offer 
was too low and not in Ruth's best interest. The Trustees did not approve of the sale. The 
Trustees further allege that over the course of their investigation related to Gary's $5 million 
offer, they discovered other wrongdoing by Defendants. The Trustees allege that Defendants 
have mismanaged LOR which has depressed the Marital Trust's income and the value of the 
Marital Trust's shares. Trustees also allege that Defendants have made unauthorized cash 
withdrawals from the Marital Trust account, and have failed to pay dividends owed. The 
Trustees' Complaint includes seven Counts: 1) Inspection of Records, 2) Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty, 3) Conversion, 4) Payment of Dividends Owed, 5) Unjust Enrichment, 6) Dissolution, and 
7) Attorneys' Fees. 
Defendants seek dismissal of all claims except for Count 1 for inspection of records. 
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring Counts 2 and 6 as a direct action 
because they are derivative in nature. Second, Defendants argue that Counts 3, 4, and 5, and 
portions of Count 2 are barred by a release in Ruth and Gary's divorce settlement agreement. 
As a part of the settlement agreement, Ruth and Gary agreed that: 
Except for the rights and claims for which this Agreement provides, each party 
releases and forever discharges the other from any and all actions, suits, debts, 
claims, demands and obligations whatsoever, both in law and equity, which each 
of them ever had, now has, or may hereafter have against the other upon or by 
reason of any matter, cause, or thing up to the date of the execution of this 
Agreement. 
Wife hereby releases and forever discharges LOR, Inc. and any of its predecessor 
company and its subsidiaries and its affiliates and all of its past and present 
employees, officers, directors, shareholders, members, and agents (hereinafter 
"LOR"), from any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands and obligations 
whatsoever, both in law and equity, which Wife ever had, now has, or may 
hereafter have against LOR, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing up to 
the date of the execution of this Agreement. 
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Settlement Agreement tj[ 19. 
It is well established that: 
[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with 
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the 
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the 
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a motion 
to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed 
them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing 
party's favor. 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73, 656 S.E.2d 820,821 (2008) (quoting 
Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
12(b)(6). 
I. A Direct Action Is Proper Because the Reasons Underlying the General Rule 
on Derivative Actions Do Not Apply (Counts 2 and 6). 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to bring a direct action for breach of 
fiduciary duty and dissolution. As a general rule, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by a director or officer of a corporation belongs to the 
corporation, not its shareholders, and should be brought as a derivative action. See O.C.G.A. §§ 
14-2-153,14-2-123; see also Barnettv. Fullard, 306 Ga. App. 151, 152 (2010). The reasons 
underlying this general rule are that a derivative action: 1) prevents a multiplicity of lawsuits by 
shareholders; 2) protects corporate creditors by putting the proceeds of the recovery back with 
the corporation; 3) protects the interests of all shareholders by increasing the value of their 
shares; and 4) adequately compensates the injured shareholder by increasing the value of his 
shares. Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 786 (1983). The Georgia Supreme Court, while 
acknowledging the general rule, directs courts to look to the "realistic objectives" of a given case 
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to determine if a direct action is proper. Id. (citing Kaplan's Nadler, Georgia Corporation Law, § 
11-16 (1971 )). In other words, a shareholder may bring a direct rather than a derivative action in 
the instance of a closely held corporation where the evidence shows that the reasons for the 
general rule requiring a derivative suit do not apply. Barnett, 306 Ga. App. at 152; Thomas at 
774-75. 
The Courts often look to the relationship of the non-party shareholders when weighing 
these objectives. In Thomas, for instance, a direct action by a minority shareholder's estate 
against a closely held company and the other two shareholders for corporate mismanagement 
was proper where the plaintiff alleged that the two defendant shareholders conspired to convert 
all profits of the corporation to themselves and deprived the plaintiff of a fair share. Thomas at 
773. Likewise, in Parks, the Court of Appeals upheld a direct action by a minority shareholder 
of a close corporation in prot because it would be "unlikely" for the other shareholders (the 
defendant's wife, children, and mother) to bring suit, and nothing in the record suggested that the 
family members had complained about the defendant's management of the company. See Parks 
v. Multimedia Technologies, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 282, 287 (1999). 
In this case, the other LOR shareholders are Gary and Randall, individually and as 
trustees of various trusts, and their children, individually and through various trusts. Although 
LOR's management by Gary and Randall has been an issue raised in other related pending 
litigation before this Court, the other family member shareholders have not joined in the lawsuits 
or the criticism of LOR's management or distributions. To the contrary, the Trustees allege that 
the other shareholders affirmatively acquiesced in Gary and Randall's conduct in exchange for 
benefits not received by the Trust. These family members also sought to intervene in support of 
Gary and Randall in the appeal of a related case challenging the management of LOR. There are 
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no alleged creditors and no other compelling reasons why the objectives of a derivative suit 
cannot be met with a direct action. Therefore the Court fmds a direct action proper is this case. 
II. Ruth Rollins' Release of Claims Against Defendants In Her Divorce 
Settlement Does Not Bar Plaintiff Trustees' Claims. 
It is a general principle of trust law that a trust can act only through its trustees and has no 
independent legal existence from its trustees. See Pricewaterhousetloopers, LLP v. Bassett, 293 
Ga. App. 284,277 (2008). Under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-261 (b)(22)(A), a trustee is authorized to 
compromise, adjust, mediate, arbitrate, or otherwise deal with and settle claims involving the 
trust. See also Skinner v. DeKalb Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 246 Ga. 561, 563 (1980) ("legal title 
is in the trustee and the cause of action is his"). Likewise, the Marital Trust indenture provides 
that "[i]n the management, care and disposition of this trust, the Trustees ... shall have the 
power ... [t]o compromise, settle or adjust any claim or demand by or against the trust and to 
agree to any rescission or modification of any contract or agreement affecting the trust."). In 
contrast, a beneficiary is legally distinct from the trust and does not have these same powers on 
behalf of the trust. See Leone Hall Price Found. v. Baker, 276 Ga. 318, 320 (2003) (holding that 
trustees were not bound by terms of settlement entered into by beneficiaries that would divest co- 
trustees of legal title to trust property). 
In this case, Gary offered $5 million dollars for the life interest in the income from the 
LOR stock held in trust for Ruth, but the agreement was expressly conditioned on the approval 
of the Trustees. The Trustees, exercising their authority under clear Georgia law and the terms 
of the Marital Trust indenture, did not approve the transaction and no money exchanged hands. 
It stands to reason that if Ruth did not have the authority to sell her interest held in trust to Gary 
for an agreed-upon amount, she would not have the authority to release or settle any claims that 
the Trustees hold on behalf of the Marital Trust. Therefore, only the Trustees, and not Ruth, had 
5 
the authority to bring and settle claims on behalf of the Marital Trust including Counts 2 through 
5 for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, payment of dividends owed, and unjust enrichment. 
Ruth's release of her own claims against Gary and LOR by operation of their divorce settlement 
agreement had no effect on the Trustees' authority to act on behalf of the Marital Trust, even if 
Gary and Ruth intended the release to be broadly construed and to include claims held by the 
Marital Trust. 
Defendants argue that the Trustees should be barred from bringing an action when the 
beneficiary has agreed to settle all claims in order to prevent circuity of action, citing 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 328. Under § 328, "[i]f a claim against a third person is held 
in trust, a discharge of the claim given by the beneficiary terminates the liability of the third 
person if, but only if, to hold the third person liable would result in circuity of action." The 
Comment to § 328 clarifies that this does not create a legal defense. Instead, it notes that an 
obligor would have an equitable defense to claims by the trust if it made payment directly to the 
beneficiary because the trustee would be required to pay the beneficiary who, having already 
been paid, would be obligated to repay the obligor. See § 328, cmt. b. The result would be the 
same "where the beneficiary gives the obligor a release of the claim against him." Id. Section 
328 has never been applied in Georgia and is not included in Restatement 3d. 
Again, it is not clear from the plain language of the release that Ruth intended to release 
LOR and Gary from these particular claims held by the Trust, particularly in light ofthe fact that 
Ruth and Gary's divorce settlement agreement acknowledges that Ruth does not have the 
authority to approve of the sale. The divorce settlement only provides that Ruth would release 
Gary and LOR from any claims Ruth ever had, now has, or may have. Ruth did not expressly 
release Defendants from claims that the Marital Trust ever had, now has, or may have. 
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Therefore, even if the circuity of action equitable defense provided by §328 applied in Georgia, 
holding defendants liable would not result in circuity of action, and defendants would not be 
entitled to equitable defense under § 328. 
Because Plaintiff Trustees have standing to bring a direct action and because the release 
by the beneficiary does not bar suit by the Trustees on claims held by the Marital Trust, 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and For Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. 
r:l..IV~ 
SO ORDERED this +11-. day of)an'tiilry, 2015. 
~bl~~e;v22?~ 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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